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The Relative Importance of Legislation,
Custom, Doctrine, and Precedent
in French Law
Yvon Loussouarn*
The law of every country reflects its civilization and often
the diversity in legal systems may be attributed to differences
in culture, philosophy, and the conditions of social life. The com-
parison of the laws of the Western world with those of China,
for example, reveals differences in their conceptions of law ex-
plainable in terms of the diversity of the civilizations in which
they are found. The comparison of Soviet law with the laws of
Western countries, on the other hand, reveals differences of
philosophy rather than of general civilization. Among the coun-
tries of the Western world, however, no important cultural dif-
ference is to be found and yet the laws of these countries do dif-
fer greatly. In Germany, Italy, France, England, and the United
States moral and religious conceptions are about the same; ap-
proximately the same ideas of justice and equity prevail; eco-
nomic conditions are not profoundly different and entail the
same kind of social life. Why, then, do the laws of the European
countries differ so widely from those of England and the United
States? They differ, it may be observed, not in their general ob-
jectives, but in the techniques through which they seek these
objectives. The laws of both groups of countries seek the same
ideal of justice, but pursue it through different technical pro-
cedures. For this reason a full comparison of the laws of the
"Common" and "Civil" law countries must be based on their
technical aspects, and chiefly on the relative importance of the
formal sources of law in those countries. Accordingly this article
will deal with the relative importance of the several formal
sources of law in the countries of European Roman law, but
especially in France. The first part will be devoted to the au-
thoritative sources of law, legislation and custom, and the second
part to the persuasive sources, judicial precedent and equity.
*Dean and Professor of Law, Facult6 de Droit de l'Universit6 de Rennes
(France), Visiting Professor, Louisiana State University Law School, Fall 1955.
Acknowledgment is made to Professor Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana State Univer-
sity Law School, who helped me in editing this article.
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PART I. THE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES OF LAW
LEGISLATION
French, German, and Italian law are "codified," and codifi-
cation entails a most important consequence, the supremacy of
legislation to every other source of law. This does not mean that
a French lawyer will find all solutions in the enactments which
are the declared will of the legislative assembly, but it does mean
that if he finds a solution there nothing in the nature of custom,
common law, or tradition can prevail against it. Legislation is
the primary authoritative source of law. It is only if the legis-
lation does not cover the question at issue that the lawyer or
judge is entitled to look elsewhere for its solution. Thus it is
that although modern science can affirm that a child cannot be
that of the husband of the mother if their blood types differ, this
fact is not enough to support a disavowal of paternity because
the French Civil Code lists only two instances in which paternity
may be disproved, the remoteness of the husband from the wife
at the time of possible conception and the wife's concealment of
the birth of the child from her husband. The discovery of mod-
ern science not having been foreseen at the time of the redaction
of the Code and this ground not having been added by amend-
ment, French judges cannot take it into account in deciding
paternity cases.'
There can be no doubt, then, that in France legislation is the
most important source of law. What are the reasons for its
supremacy? The first is certainly a matter of history, chiefly
the effect of the French Revolution of 1789. Before the Revolu-
tion, French law was neither codified nor unified. The law of
the southern portion of France was based primarily on the Ro-
man law as found in the Corpus Juris and for that reason this
part of France was known as the pays de droit 6crit. The north-
ern portion of France was governed largely by custom and was
known as the pays de co'ztume.2 The Revolution brought about
the complete discard of these older regimes. Article 7 of the Civil
Code expressly repealed the sources of law recognized before its
1. Barbier, L'examen du sang et le r6le du juge dans lea procas relatifs la
filiation, 47 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 345 (1949) ; Nerson, Lea
progr48 8cientifiques et l'6volution du droit familial, in 1 LE DROIT PRIVt FRANVAIS
AU MILIEU DU XX ° SIACLE 403 (1950) ; Savatier, Le droit civil de la famille et
le conqudtes de la biologic, RECUEiL DALLOZ 1948, Chronique IX.
2. LEPOINTE, PETIT PRACIS DES SOURCES DE L'HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRANQAIS
(1949) ; 1 LEvY-BRunL, INTRODUCTION A L'ItTUDE DU DROIT 265 (1951) ; OLIVIER-
MARTIN, HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRANQAIS DES ORIGINES 1 LA Rt4VOLUTION (1951).
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enactment, and if the purpose of this provision was primarily to
secure unification of law in France it was also to affirm the su-
premacy of legislation over custom.3 It is probable that without
the Revolution the French would not have rid themselves so
easily of their former customary and Roman law traditions.
England, for example, has never broken completely with her
ancient law and even today many solutions there depend on cus-
toms or enactments of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Yet
not every revolution in history has produced such a break with
the past, and to understand this effect of the French Revolution
it is necessary to understand some of its basic ideas.
The first of these basic concepts was that equality among
citizens could be obtained more easily through legislation than
through custom, for much of the diversity in French customary
law had its foundation in differences among the social categories
of persons. The second basic concept was that of freedom, or
liberty, which in the French mind led to a sharp and one-way
conception of the principle of separation of powers. Liberty in-
cluded freedom to determine one's laws through elected repre-
sentatives and, indeed, the French Civil Code provides sanctions
for judicial encroachments on the legislative and executive pow-
ers, but none for legislative or executive interference with the
judicial function. Thus Article 4 of the Civil Code declares that
the judge who refuses to decide a case on the ground that it is
not covered by legislation may be prosecuted for a "denial of
justice" to the parties and, in so providing, at once presumes the
all-sufficiency of the legislation and requires the judge to fit the
case as best he can into a mold provided by it. Obviously nothing
but legislation was to be given the force of law, and nothing but
the legislative assembly was to have the power to declare law.
Article 5 of the Civil Code further guarantees this exclusive
authority of the legislature by forbidding judges to issue arrets
de reglement, that is to say, to indicate the constructions or in-
terpretations of the legislation which would be followed in like
future cases. 4 Precedent, though only in the form of the judicial
interpretation or construction of the declared legislative will,
was not to have any effect as law, and in each case the judge was
3. MARTY, LA DISTINCTION DU FAIT ET DU DROIT, ESSAI SUR LE POUVOIR DE
CONTROLE DE LA COUR DE CASSATION SUR LES JUGES DU FAIT, thesis, 100 (1929);
1 & 2 PAILLIET, MANUEL COMPLtMENTAIRE DES CODES FRANQAIS (1845).
4. 1 MARTY ET RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 202, n, 119 (1956); Cass. civ., July
16, 1955, 1955 DROIT SOCIAL 528.
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to apply the legislation itself without reference to past applica-
tions of it.
The relative importance of legislation in France is further
enhanced by the absence of any ordinary judicial control over
its constitutionality. 5 A judge cannot refuse to apply legislation
because he considers it unconstitutional. For example, a 1947
enactment concerning letters of credit violated the Bern Conven-
tion to which France had been a signatory. Under the French
Constitution of 1946 a treaty is paramount to internal legisla-
tion. Yet the judge could not apply the constitutional and treaty
provisions and ignore 1947 legislation, for this would have
amounted to a declaration of the latter's unconstitutionality. The
only remedy was for the legislative assembly to repeal the act,
but had it refused to do so French courts would have been obliged
to enforce the unconstitutional legislation. There is, of course, a
difference between constitutional and ordinary legislation in
France, but the importance of this difference lies only in the
manner in which the one or the other may be formally repealed. 7
An ordinary law cannot repeal a constitutional provision, though
it can repeal an ordinary law. Nevertheless, as a practical mat-
ter the latest legislation is the primary source of law and it is so
simply because a judge does not have the power to declare a law
unconstitutional.
This is, nevertheless, a superficial view of the problem. To
determine the exact place of legislation in a legal system it is
necessary to take into account two main considerations: the in-
terpretation of legislation and the area or scope of subject mat-
ter covered by legislation. It may be mentioned in advance that
these two factors are rather contradictory in French law, for the
evolution of interpretation tends to minimize the importance of
legislation and on the other hand the increase of matters specif-
ically covered by legislation in fact augments its importance as a
source of law.
5. Blondel, Le contr6le juridictionnel de la Constitutionnalitd des lois en
France, MtLANGES HAURIOU, p. 211; Hauriou, La technique frangaise en matidre
de contrdle juridictionnel de la constitutionnalitd des lis, 2 MALANGES LAMBERT
336; G~ny, De l'inconstitutionnalit6 des lois et des autres actes do l'autoritd pub-
lique et des sanctions qu'elle comporte dons le droit nouveau de la IV6 Rdpublique
franvais, 1 JURIS-CLAsSEUB PERIODIQUE 613 (1947) ; Mignon, Lo contrdle juridic-
tionnel de la constitutionnalit6 des lois, in RECUEIL DALLOZ 1952, Chronique, p. 45.
6. See Houin, La loi inconstitutionnelle du 4 septembre 1947 sur La domicilia-
tion des effets de commerce, 1 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 209
(1948).
7. PRAtLOT, PRCIS BE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL no 31; Mignon, La valeur
juridique du Pr6ambule de la Constitution selon la Doctrine et la jurisprudence




In a codified system of law interpretation is the fundamental
problem. The legislation is nearly always in the form of general
rules, but these must be applied to particular cases. In logical
terms, the fact situation in the particular case must be given a
legal characterization so that it may serve as the minor premise
of a syllogism the major premise of which is a general rule of
law.8 Once the lawyer or judge has cast his problem in this form,
the result follows with inescapable necessity, without his being
able to use the least discretion, for such is the compelling nature
of formal logic. It is merely a demonstration of identity or of
inclusion. But though the syllogistic form compels a legal solu-
tion with logical necessity, there is little necessity about the char-
acterization of the facts for the formulation of the minor premise
and still less about the selection of the general rule of law which
is to serve as the major premise. This is the reason interpreta-
tion is all important, for the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the
general rule of law will determine its applicability to the case
at hand. This problem of interpretation presents two main ques-
tions: in whom does the authority to interpret legislation rest,
and according to what methods and norms is the process to be
carried out.
In whom rests the authority to interpret legislation? In a
legal system in which legislation is theoretically the only source
of law, the interpretative function logically belongs to the legis-
lature itself. The legislature should be the entity most capable
of clarifying what it means by a statement which purports to ex-
press its collective will. This system, known as the rdfPr6 lgis-
latif, was much used in France in the period immediately follow-
ing the enactment of the Civil Code.9 A judge in doubt about the
meaning of a text suspended proceedings until the question was
put to the legislative assembly and answered by the enactment
of an interpretative act. This procedure still exists, though in-
stances of its use are rare.10 The difficulties and delays involved
are so great that it is resorted to only when no reasonable mean-
ing can be derived from the enacted text. Practically the judge
must be allowed to interpret legislation. By acting as an inter-
8. MARTY, LA DISTINCTION DU FAIT ET DU DROIT,*EssAI SUB LE POUVOIR DE
CONTROLE DE LA COUR DE CASSATION SUR LES JUGES DU FAIT, THESIS, 11 (1929) ;
MOTULSKY, PRINCIPES D'UNE RALISATION M ]THODIQUE DU DROIT PRIVit 47 (1948).
9. 2 ENCYCLOPADIE DALLOZ, DROIT CIVIL, V0 Interpr6tation n* 10.




preter the judge necessarily shares in the process of making law,
thus limiting to a degree the supremacy of the legislature; and
the extent to which he shares in this law-making process depends
on the theory or method of interpretation employed.
The methods of interpretation. Two major theories of inter-
pretation have prevailed in France, that of exegesis,"' or the
elaboration of texts, and that of "free scientific research, 1 2 in
which the enacted texts are in reality only one source of the in-
terpreter's ideas. It is perfectly understandable that exegesis
should have become the exclusive method of interpretation in the
period immediately after the enactment of the Civil Code. The
Code was indeed wonderfully adapted to the necessities and con-
ditions of life of the time and both this fact and the desire to
preserve the supremacy of the legislature contributed to the ten-
dency to seek the solution of every legal problem within the letter
of its texts. But in the course of the nineteenth century, largely
because of the development of industry and the astounding ad-
vance of the material sciences, the conditions of social and eco-
nomic life in France changed more than they had in the ten pre-
ceding centuries. General legislative revision did not occur, and
thus it became necessary to adapt the old texts to serve the new
conditions, to reinterpret them in such a manner as to sever them
from the social and economic theories of the Revolution and per-
mit their application in a manner consistent with the prevailing
social and economic thought. It was Francois G~ny who more
than anyone else formulated the new method and gave it its the-
oretical foundation. These two methods, that of exegesis and of
free scientific research, will be considered in succession.
The exegetical method requires that every solution be based
on the enacted legislative texts. Two situations may be differ-
entiated, however. Either there is a text applicable to the case
at hand, but whose exact coverage or disposition of the case is
not clear, or there is no specific text which of itself can serve to
regulate the matter. In the first situation the initial procedure
11. BONNECASE, L'tCOLE DE L'EXtGhSE EN DROIT CIVIL (2d ed. 1924) ; GAUDE-
MET, L'INTERPRtTATION DU CODE CIVIL EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1804 (1935); Char-
mont et Chausse, Les interpr6tes du Code Civil, 1 LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 131;
COHENDY, LA MtTHODE D'UN ARRATISTE AU XIX e SIPCLE, LA THEMIS, 1819-1831,
SON FONDATEUR Athanase Jourdan (2d ed. 1914) ; COTIENDY, LA MITHODE D'UN
ARRPTISTE AU XIX o SIOCLE: LABBt, THESIS (1910).
12. GtNY, MtTIODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVIE POSITIF (2d
ed. 1954) ; LAMBERT, LA FONCTION DU DROIT CIVIL COMPARt (1903) ; GAUDEMET,
L'oeuvre de Saleilles et l'oeuvre do Gdny en mdthodologie juridique et en philos-
ophie du droit, in 5 RECUEIL D'ETUDES SUR LE SOURCES DU DROIT EN L'ITONNEUR DE
FRANCOIS GtNY 5 (1934).
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is to make a profound examination of the provision itself. This
is a somewhat unreliable process, for experience has shown that
it is fairly easy to discover almost any meaning in a text, espe-
cially if one finds it favorable. The second step is to consider the
context of the provision to be construed. This is more reliable,
for in this case the text can be related to the principle on which
it is based or to which it is an exception. Often the very section
of the Code in which a provision is found will facilitate the fix-
ing of its scope of application. In the chapter on marriage, for
example, it is said that the enumerated causes of nullity are
exclusive, but this provision is not applied to contracts generally
because of the context in which it is found. Yet even the rela-
tion of a provision to its context is somewhat unreliable as an
indication of its meaning and application, for the Civil Code is
not very systematically or rationally divided. The third book of
the Civil Code, for example, includes the legislation on succes-
sions, marriage regimes, donations, obligations, and various con-
tracts, matters which have little in common among them. Under
such conditions it is at least difficult to sustain that the location
of a particular provision should be considered in determining its
meaning.13 The third and last general exegetical procedure for
discovering the possible meaning of a text is to consider the
travaux pr6paratoires,'4 or the discussions and declarations of
objectives and scope which took place in the various stages of the
legislative enactment process. Obviously, the resources of the
exegetical method are rather limited.
If the case is one which may not be considered covered by any
specific text, the theory of the supremacy of legislation never-
theless demands that it be the source of the rule actually applied
for its solution. According to the classical doctrine, three logical
forms are used to discover the applicable rule, the arguments
a fortiori, by analogy, and a contrario.'5 The argument a fortiori
consists in the application to the case at hand of a rule legisla-
tively prescribed for a similar case on the ground that the rea-
sons for its prescription for that case apply with even more force
to the case to be decided. The argument by analogy also applies
a prescribed rule to a similar unprovided for case, but it does
13. Cass. civ., April 20, 1920, D.P. 1923.1.87; Amiens, July 8, 1954, D. 1955,
som., p. 8.
14. Capitant, L'interprdtation des lois d'apr~s les travaus prdparatoires, in
RECUEIL DALLOZ 1935, Chronique, p. 77.




so simply because the unforeseen case is similar to that expressly
provided for, not because there is more reason for applying the
same rule. The arguments a fortiori and by analogy, therefore,
differ not so much in their essential nature as in the extension
recognized for the principle behind the rules legislatively pre-
scribed and to be formulated by the judge for the particular case
at hand. The argument a contrario is totally different. It con-
sists in denying the applicability of a particular rule on the
ground that inasmuch as the legislature has provided expressly
for specific situations not inclusive of the case to be decided, it
must have been intended that that case not be governed by that
provision. Often all of these arguments can be made with equal
facility and force for an unprovided for case, and the problem
then becomes one of choosing among them. A celebrated prob-
lem of this kind involved the validity of arbitration clauses in
contracts other than for labor and insurance, for which latter
there was express legislative authorization. Some argued a
fortiori that the laws authorizing arbitration clauses in labor
and insurance contracts were merely special applications of a
general principle which should be given the effect of a rule of
law. On the other hand others urged the argument a contrario
to deny that arbitration clauses could be inserted in other con-
tracts.
Though both methods of interpretation in fact partake of the
legislative function, the classical, or exegetical, in theory does
not, for through it the judge seeks merely to discover and apply
the legislative will. Thus exegesis recognizes the supremacy of
the legislative authority. This interpretative method prevailed
throughout the nineteenth century and during that time France
was truly a jurisdiction of legislative law. But the reasons for
the adoption of the exegetical method, the faith in a well con-
ceived and executed code and the desire to maintain popular con-
trol over the law making process, also explain its dissuetude. The
Code had been drafted and adopted to reflect and sustain the
social and economic life of 1804, but as those conditions changed
the provisions of the Code gradually lost their justification or
appropriateness. The rules of the Code as written and originally
conceived sometimes made a mockery of justice, but exegesis
paralyzed the judge and prevented him from adapting the texts
to the current conditions of life. Besides, problems nonexistent
and unforeseeable at the time of the adoption of the Code multi-
[Vol. XVIII
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plied at a constantly increasing rate. Thus a new approach to
the process of interpreting and applying the law had to be found.
French doctrine, led by Frangois G6ny, successfully urged the
abandonment of exclusive reliance on exegesis and the adoption
of a method of interpretation which places more freedom and
responsibility in the judge.
The method of free scientific research, as G4ny called it, does
not ignore legislation where it clearly applies to the question at
issue, but seeks to reinterpret it so as to give it an application
which is consistent with the changed conditions which it is now
called upon to regulate. The original intention of the legislature
ceases to be controlling, and instead the judge must seek to give
the text that meaning which the legislature would have enacted
had it been acting at the present rather than in the past. In cases
in which there is no text applicable, the judge engages in a sim-
ilar activity, attempting to find a rule which the legislature
would have enacted had it foreseen the case. Obviously such a
method is legislative in its essence. Respect is given the formal
expression of the legislative will, no matter what its age, but its
meaning may be altered completely to adapt it to conditions call-
ing for other solutions. Its genius is that it eliminates the
paralyzing and stagnating effect of exegesis and permits the
judge to decide cases without engaging in the hypocrisy that he
is doing justice when in fact he applies a rule no longer suited to
the purpose or pretends to do so when in fact he has changed the
rule by his interpretation. Thus the new doctrine gives legisla-
tion a new character, divorcing it from any necessary connection
with the original intention of the legislature, making its meaning
alterable, and connecting it with other social sciences by impos-
ing on the judge the obligation to consider what its meaning
should be. Indeed, the new method of necessity worked a sub-
stantial change in French legal thought, for now it must be ad-
mitted that justice is not synonymous with legislation, and that
the legislation must always be made to do justice. But interpre-
tation through free scientific research has its inconveniences and
dangers, and not the least among them is that a judge may ex-
periment too hastily or impose private opinions which may not
conform even to an adaption of declared legislative will. Against
this danger there is not sufficient safeguard.
In the last analysis, current French interpretative doctrine
is a mixture of the exegetical and that of free scientific re-
19581
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search. 16 The method actually used in any instance depends on
the subject matter, the age of the provision, its clarity or lack of
it, and whether or not the case or issue has been foreseen. Crim-
inal legislation is given a very restricted meaning and applica-
tion. In private international law the judge has the utmost free-
dom. In civil law an intermediary method prevails. If the issue
has been provided for in the legislation, usually there is only a
matter of construction. On the other hand, if the matter is new
and unprovided for, a rule derived by free scientific research is
applied. No doubt the supremacy of the legislation has been af-
fected and the authority of the judge increased, but at the same
time the tendency to cover more situations in detailed legislation,
a movement to be considered next, has given legislation a new
importance in fixing the rule of law.
The Enlargement of the Area of Detailed Imperative Legislation
Although the now accepted role of interpretation tends to
detract from the supremacy of legislation as a formal source of
law, the role of legislation in the total specification of order has
become more important by reason of another development, the
very substantial increase in the coverage of detailed imperative
laws.
The Code Civil's emphasis on freedom or private order. The
philosophical conceptions dominant after the French Revolution
held equality before the law and maximum freedom to be the
ideals of order. All men were to be as free as possible in their
activities and in determining their rights and obligations toward
others, and imperative, non-waivable rules of law were to be kept
at the minimum required to preserve these conditions of equality
and freedom. The Code Civil reflected these conceptions. The
primary principle was announced very compactly in Article 6,
which is identical with the first paragraph of Article 11 of the
Louisiana Civil Code:
"Individuals cannot by their conventions derogate from the
force of laws made for the preservation of public order and
good morals."
Thus only laws enacted for the preservation of public order and
16. Bonnecase, La pens8e juridique frangaise de 1804 d nos jours, REPORTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WEEK ON LAW (1950) ; ROUAST, LES SOURCES DU DROIT ET
LE CODE NAPOLtON; ROUBIER, LA MATHODE DEPUIS LE CODE CIVIL DE 1804 AU
POINT DE VUE DE LA TECHNIQUE JuRIDIQUE; BOULANGER, LA M1tTHODE DEPUIS LE
CODE CIVIL DE 1804 AU POINT DE VUE DE L'INTERPRATATION JUDICIAIRE.
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good morals were imperative. Other laws declared what the
legislature considered good rules for the regulation of the rights
and obligations among private persons; but these laws, deemed
enacted in the interest of individuals rather than in the interest
of the general public, could be waived by them if they saw fit.17
Article 1134 of the Code, which corresponds to Article 1901 of
the Louisiana Civil Code, went so far as to state that:
"Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on
those who have formed them."
So strong was the theory of freedom of self-determination that
some legal scientists interpreted this article to mean that con-
tract was a source of law and not merely of rights and obliga-
tions for the parties.' Of course this was error, for it is the law
itself which authorizes and sanctions the contracts of persons,
but the point does illustrate the force with which the notion of
self-determination prevailed.
Self-determination was evidenced strongest in the economic
order, which reflected this concept in terms of laissez-faire in-
dividualism. But even where contract as such was not involved,
equality and freedom characterized the law. The laws relating
to property assured the owner of almost absolute license to use
his property as he wished, a minimum of restrictions existing in
favor of other individuals. The absolute right to partition as-
sured the owner opportunity to gain complete control over spe-
cific property rather than remain a partner, as it were, in a
larger amount of property. The prohibition against substitutions
gave the living maximum control over their property during life,
and the laws on forced heirship worked a compromise between
freedom of disposition at death and equality in the treatment of
the heirs. Only in the area of personal status and family rela-
tions did the ideals of freedom and equality have less effect.
The present emphasis on a regulated social and economic
order. The changes in social and economic conditions during the
nineteenth and present centuries, greater than in the preceding
thousand years, especially the development of industry and its
consequences, soon made it evident that men were not in fact
equal in working out their rights and obligations and that the
freedom granted under the laws frequently gave the economically
17. 1 MARTY ET RAYNAUD, DROIT CIViM no (1956); Niboyet, La force des
r~gle8 de droit, in ETUDES SUGIYAMA 241 (1941).
18. GOUNOD, LE PRINCIPE DE L'AUTONOMIE DE LA VOLONTA, TRESIS, 240 (1912).
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strong the means of taking advantage of the economically weak.
It was increasingly necessary, therefore, to replace the free econ-
omy with a more regulated one, and this required much legisla-
tion both detailed and imperative in character.19 Thus the area
of public order, as opposed to private order, was augmented con-
siderably.20 Regulation of the use of private property has re-
placed its free use, which so often had been abused, and this has
been accomplished largely by the enactment of an immense body
of legislation. The principal example here is that of monetary
and trade control. Freedom of contract has been much curtailed.
Contracts for labor, insurance, and house rentals, for example,
must contain mandatory provisions, or be in certain standard
forms, or otherwise conform to a large measure of regulation.
These laws, all considered enacted in the public interest, must
apply imperatively if they are to accomplish their purpose and
are considered to pertain to the public order.
Thus it is that the public order has come to encompass a very
large area of activity either non-existent in the early nineteenth
century or then left to private determination. If formerly public
order encompassed mostly purely personal relations and the social
rather than economic aspects of property, now an economic ele-
ment has been added. Doctrinally, a distinction is made between
"classical public order" and "economic public order,"' 21 but these
expressions should be understood as references to the different
contents of public order in classical and present times, and not
as references to different kinds of public order. The concept, or
principle, of public order does not change; but its specification
varies with the conditions of life which the law is called upon to
order. Today the general interest demands the imperative regu-
lation of relations among men to a far greater extent than in
1804.
Many French legal scientists are of the opinion that the in-
crease in imperative legislation has offset whatever loss legisla-
19. CHARMONT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT cIvIL (1912) ; MORIN, LA
RtVOLTE DES FAITS CONTRE LE CODE CIVIL (1920) ; RIPERT, LE RtGIME DAMO-
C9ATIQUE ET LE DROIT CIVIL MODERNE (1936) ; Ripert, Le droit priv6 frangais au
milieu da XX ° Sicle, in ETUDES OFFERTES (1950); SAVATIEB, LES MtTAMOR-
PHOSES tCONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DU DROIT CIVIL D'AUJOURD'HUI (1948) ; Sava-
tier, Deatin du Code frangais, 6 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARA 637
(1954).
20. Julliot de la Morandibre, L'ordre public en droit prive interne, in ETUDES
CAPITANT, p. 381; RiERT, LA RhGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 23
(4th ed. 1949) ; Dabin, Autonomie de la volontd et lois impdratives: ordre public
en bonnes moeurs, in ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES 190 (1940)
-MALAURIE, L'ORDRE PUBLIC ET LE CONTRAT, THESIS (1952).
21. Ripert, L'ordre public dconomique, in MPLANGES GtNY (1927).
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tive supremacy may have suffered by reason of current methods
of interpretation, which, as we have seen, have caused French
legal method to approach that of the common law systems. 22 The
opinion, however, is not completely justified, for account must be
taken of the fact that the extensive proliferation l~gislative tends
to deprive legislation of its cogency and to make the judge less
respectful of the written law. Perhaps it would be more accurate
to say that legislation has lost supremacy as the supposedly
unique source of right (droit), but remains supreme as the
most important single source of law or legal rules (loi).
CUSTOM
The fact that legislation no longer is regarded as the sole
source of law (in the sense of droit or right) opens the question
whether custom can be considered either a primary or a supple-
mentary source of law. But first some effort must be made to
determine the nature of custom.
Definition of Custom
Article 3 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares:
"Customs result from a long series of actions constantly
repeated, which have by such repetition, and by uninterrupt-
ed acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit and common
consent."
Unfortunately for French jurists, the Code Civil does not pro-
vide a definition of custom and their opinions vary concerning
its proper content.
One opinion would include in custom every legal formulation
not included in the written law itself, i.e., the practice, usages,
received doctrine, and even the circumstances of social life.
28
This definition is too broad for custom which is to have the force
of law, for certainly the judge is not obliged to follow or respect
all practices, usages, doctrinal opinions, and social habits, and
coerciveness is a prime quality of law. A second opinion assimi-
lates custom to usages of daily life, social, business, industrial,
and agricultural, and even the rules of etiquette and moral and
22. RIPERT, LE DtCLIN DU DROIT, ATUDES SUR LA LEGISLATION CONTEMPORAINE
(1949) ; Savatier, Rdali8me et iddalisme en droit civil in Le droit priv6 frangai8
au milieu du XXO sidcle, in 1 ETUDES OFFERTES A G. RIPERT 75.
23. LEBRUN, LA COUTtME, SES SOURCES, SON AUTORITIt EN DROIT PRIV]A, THESIS
(1932) ; ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOZ, 1 DROIT CIVIL v* Coutlame (1951).
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religious practices. 24 It is true the written law itself occasionally
refers to and incorporates usages of various kinds, which there-
by gain coercive quality, but otherwise these usages are not bind-
ing juridically and of necessity cannot have the force of law. A
third opinion limits custom to jurisprudence or case law. This,
too, must be rejected, for under Article 5 of the Code Civil, which
prohibits arr~ts de r~glement, judicial decisions may not be con-
sidered binding for the future.2 5
Thus it would seem that for a practice to be considered cus-
tom it must not only be generally recognized and constant, but
also generally regarded as juridically binding.26 It is practice re-
flecting a juridical sentiment. This definition has three ad-
vantages. First, if the practice is not regarded as binding in law,
it is mere usage, and custom and usage are thus distinguished.
So it is that in France the wife's assumption of the husband's
name is custom rather than usage precisely because there is the
general sentiment that the practice is binding.
The second merit of the definition of custom just given is
that it permits differentiation of custom and conventional usage,
a practice which many consider custom, but which in reality lies
between custom and usage. These conventional usages, those
practices, sometimes general, more often local or professional,
which cover completely the formation of contracts, are partic-
ularly frequent in commercial law. By virtue of the principle
of the autonomy of the will limited by the notion of good faith,
these conventional usages are implied in every act in order to
construe or to complete the intention of the parties. Such usages
are very numerous in the relations between merchants, in labor
law, in letters of credit, in maritime contracts, and usually in
international trades. Some references are made to them in the
legislation on these subjects.
Often the French Civil Code, in stating general rules for the
interpretation of contracts or determining their contents, alludes
to conventional usages, and an act of June 13, 1866, has fixed
legislatively the most important of them for commercial sales.
For most of the authors these conventional usages are only
24. PACJiE, LA COUTtME ET 'LES USAGES EN DROIT POSITIF, THESIS (1938).
25. Meynial, Sur le r6le joud par la doctrine et la jurisprudence dans P'oeuvre
d'unification du droit en France, 27 REVUE G]!tNt]RALE DU DROIT ET LA JURISPRU-
DENCE 326, 446 (1903).
26. 1 GtNY, MItTODE D'INTERPRPTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIV! POSITIF;
ESSAI CRITIQUE 316 (2d ed. 1954) ; comp. Lambert, Etude du droit commun 1dgi8-
latif, Introduction, 1 LA FONCTION DU DROIT CIVIL COMPARt (1903).
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one aspect of custom. Some of them go further and think that
only conventional usages constitute custom. This was the posi-
tion adopted by Lyon-Caen and Renault.27 For them the value
of usages, just as the value of custom, rested upon the idea of a
tacit convention. This confusion is understandable, for it seems
there is a great analogy between conventional usages and custom.
Each consists in practices having, in the thought of the persons
concerned, a juridical value. Furthermore, because the role of
conventional usages is to supply or to construe the intention of
the parties, they are in that respect a real rule of the law; legis-
lation, when not imperative, has exactly the same function.
Nevertheless, a deeper examination of the question enables us
to question this analogy. Doubtless conventional usage resembles
custom in that it too presupposes an accepted and constant prac-
tice. But it is doubtful that it contains the psychological element,
which is the second element of custom, the opinio juris, or juri-
dical sentiment, according to which the practice is considered
binding in law. The usages of merchants and the usages of busi-
ness, in most cases, may be referred to in order to supply or
construe the intention of the parties only because the parties are
presumed to have taken these usages into account. This very
choice excludes from the minds of the parties any feeling of
being juridically bound by the usage.
Yet to deny to conventional usage the character of real
custom does not imply that it cannot be in some way a source
of law. But between the rules derived from conventional usages
and the rules which issue from an interpretative, non-imperative
legislation, there are two fundamental differences. On the one
hand, legislation contains in itself and directly expresses the
rule designed to supply the expression of the intention of the
parties, whereas the rule derived from conventional usage is
dicovered indirectly by the application of a different principle,
that of the autonomy of the will. On the other hand, and this,
is the second difference, on practical grounds, if the law auto-
matically construes the will of the parties, conventional usages
merely suggest an intention which is not expressed, and then
only if the facts of the case permit this induction of the un-
expressed intention of the parties. It would seem, therefore,
that conventional usages are nearer in nature to contract than
27. 1 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITA DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 90 (10th ed.
1921) ; comp. Escarre, La valeur juridique de l'usage en droit commercial, in AN-
NALES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 97 (1910) ; ValIry, La coutlme commerciale, REvUR
CRITIQUE DE LAOISLATIF ET JURISPRUDENCE 418 (1916-1924).
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they are to custom, and this conventional nature entails an im-
portant consequence which makes them very different from
custom.
Conventional usages, not implying the opinio juris, the juri-
dical sentiment which is one element of custom, can be considered
as a source of law only if they were known to the parties, or,
at least, if it is possible to presume that they intended to adopt
them. On the contrary, a customary rule supplying the will of
the parties should be binding for the judge even if it is com-
pletely unknown to the parties, for the presumption which con-
stitutes its basis exists precisely to establish a fixity in juridical
relations and to avoid difficulties of fact.
The third and last advantage of the definition of custom
above given is that it explains the decline of custom in the
modern systems of law. It is obvious, certainly, that the com-
plication of social relationships, the confusion of ethnic groups,
and the alteration of national aspirations by the cosmopolitism
now necessary for a strong political organization, all compel
customary law to yield to the more and more important role of
written law. Indeed, custom implying a common juridical senti-
ment can be developed only in small groups close to that Old
World influence under which the common decision is imposed
on every member of the group. But this condition requires small
groups. When the state grows, general customs become less fre-
quent and special customs appear in autonomous groups. But if
this autonomy of the small group disappears by virtue of a
politically powerful government, the last source of custom is
exhausted, for a common, general juridical sentiment no longer
can arise.
For this reason, the social and political evolution which we
have experienced limits the role of custom even in the countries
of common law. But does this mean that in a codified system
custom cannot be a source of law?
Custom as a Source of Law28
A solution to this question is not to be found in the different
codes of France. Doubtless Article 7 of the Code Civil and Ar-
ticle 1041 of the Code of Civil Procedure repealed all legisla-
28. Esmein, La coutiame doit-elle 6tre reconnue comme source du droit civil
franvais, BULLETIN DE LA SOCIItTP D'ETUDES LtGISLATIVES 533-44 (1905).
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tion and custom on the same subjects existing prior to the
enactment of these codes. But these articles do not deal with
the question of the validity of custom arising subsequent to the
enactment of those codes. As to the Commercial Code, Article 2
repeals the former commercial legislation without alluding to
commercial custom. For this reason, in the absence of an ex-
press legislative provision, a solution must be sought in the
doctrine and in the jurisprudence.
From a doctrinal basis, the importance of custom in French
law has been closely allied to the development of the methods
of interpretation. The school of exegesis, the most prominent
school of the nineteenth century, did not consider custom as a
source of law. For its exponents legislation was the only source
of law. They believed there could be no place for a tacit mani-
festation of the will of the people (custom) as long as their
express will (legislation) existed. The school of exegesis sought
everything in the Code. Later, with the appearance of the
method of free scientific research, the role of custom grew con-
siderably in French law and modern French and other European
writers admit that custom is a source of law. There is, however,
some misunderstanding as to the exact importance of custom
which results from a failure to distinguish two entirely different
species of custom: that which is called custom praeter legem, or
custom as to a matter not covered by legislation, and custom
contra legem, or custom contrary to existing legislation on the
subject.
Today custom praeter legem is generally admitted to be a
source of law and, in this respect, French civil law acknowledges
its legitimacy. Our courts believe there is no reason to exclude
this kind of custom and there are some rules of civil law which
are exclusively customary. For instance, in France all the rules
regarding names and surnames are customary. So it was that
in a decision of March 5, 1944, the Chambre des Requetes29 de-
cided that in a non-codified matter like that concerning names
custom has "sovereign" authority for the simple reason that
modern legislation has not provided for it.
The second problem is much more controversial. May custom
be a source of law when it is in conflict with a provision of
legislation which has foreseen the case ?30 To answer in the
29. S.1945.1.40.




affirmative is to admit that legislation may be repealed by non-
usage or desuetude. In application, the later rule, customary or
legislative, would be considered paramount and custom would
have the same force as legislation. This conflict is not resolved
by Article 7 of the Code Civil, which repeals only such custom
as existed at the time of its enactment, but does not mention
custom arising subsequent to the Code Civil. Some French
writers contend that custom has the same authority as legis-
lation and that custom contra legem can repeal a provision of
the Code. This was the position adopted chiefly by Colin and
CapitantA1 But the solution is not admitted by the French
courts, which deny both custom contra legem and the repeal of
legislation by desuetude.8 2 A provision of law remains valid, at
least theoretically, even if it has not been applied for many
years. Thus the Cour de Cassation in two decisions of February
4, 1898,33 considered valid and in force two decrees of March 2
and 21, 1848, even though they had never been applied.
In order to understand this position fully, two situations
must be distinguished. In practice, if persons prefer to observe
a custom contra legem, the provision of law which it contravenes
may remain without being applied for many years. But this is
true only in the absence of dispute between the parties. If one
of them invokes the legislation in his favor, it will be applied by
the judge even if -it is contrary to a custom. There is, however,
one exception which is admitted by certain courts in the field
of the commercial law. Several decisions of the French courts
have admitted the validity of custom against legislation, basing
their decisions on the fact that Article 2 of the Commercial
Code repealed only the legislation and not the custom which
existed prior to its enactment.
Thus it may be said custom is only a subsidiary source of
law; but in spite of this limitation of its role, it has a real im-
portance which depends ultimately on the question of its proof.
This problem of the proof of custom is fundamental because
it is not sufficient to affirm theoretically that custom is a source
31. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ILt MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no
30 (10th ed. 1953).
32. Cass. crim. June 30, 1827, Dalloz, Jur. G~n. v0 Forts, no 1769; Cass. crim.
October 3, 1828, Dalloz, Jur. G4n., v° Cassation, no 1407; Cas. civ. January 25,
1841, 8.1841.1.105; Cas. civ. July 11, 1855, D.P. 1856.1.9; Cas. civ. April 13,
1897, S.1897.1.404; Cass. r4unies, January 31, 1901, D.P. 1901.1.69; Cass. civ.
October 20, 1902, D.P.1902.1.519; Cass. crim. January 4, 1917, D.P.1922.5.5; Cass.




of law. On practical grounds, the litigant who invokes a custom
must be able to prove its existence, if he wants to win his law-
suit; but it is much more difficult to prove the existence of
custom than it is to prove the existence of a legislative provision.
To prove the existence of a legislative provision it is only neces-
sary to open the Code; to prove the existence of a custom, it is
necessary to prove a constant practice, and that this practice
corresponds to a juridical sentiment. This is very difficult to do.8 4
It will suffice here to discuss only the problem of the burden
of proof of custom. Here, we have to take into consideration
the fact that every legal relationship raises a double difficulty
of proof to the judge, the proof of the fact which gives rise to
the application of the rule of law, and the proof of this rule of
law itself. If the judge must consider the two aspects of the
problem, his position is not the same with regard to each.
Whereas proof of a fact must be made by the litigant who al-
leges it, the judge takes judicial cognizance of legislation. For
custom, the difficulty as a rule of law is that it has its origin in
a succession of facts and practices, so that it may be difficult
to choose between the rules governing the proof of facts and the
rules governing the proof of law.
On practical grounds, the situation of the plaintiff is very
different according to the solution given. If the burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff, it is difficult for him to win his suit. If,
however, the judge must take judicial cognizance of custom,
the situation of the plaintiff is improved. But, on theoretical
grounds, this very fact gives some indication of the real char-
acter of custom. If custom is really a source of law, cognizance
of it must be taken by the judge. This connection between the
nature of a rule of law and its proof is illustrated by the French
rule on the proof of foreign law. In France a foreign law is
applied only as a fact made significant by the French conflict of
laws rule, and for this reason the plaintiff is obliged to prove
the content of the foreign law.3 5
Before the enactment of the Code Civil the courts and doc-
trinal writers, wishing to assure the supremacy of Roman law
over the local customs, considered custom as a mere fact and
authorized the application of custom only if the litigants alleged
34. 1 MARTY ET RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 195 (1956).




and proved it. During the nineteenth century this position was
adopted by the school of exegesis. The first reaction against
this solution had its origin in German doctrine, which pointed
out its illogical character. Doubtless customary law has its
origin in situations of fact and it is proved by the existence of
these situations of fact. But these facts constitute of themselves
a rule of law which the judge has to apply. This solution was
adopted in France by the adherents to the doctrine of free
scientific research and it led to a revival of custom at the end
of the nineteenth century and during the twentieth.
What exactly is the present position of the French courts on
this question? Since its decision of December 22, 1902,86 the
Cour de Cassation holds that the judge must take cognizance of
a custom, if he knows of its existence, even if the litigants do
not invoke it. Nevertheless, the existence of custom being less
certain than the existence of legislation, the judge must be
cautious. He will apply custom of his own accord only if he is
certain of its existence. If the existence of a custom is disputed,
the judge must require the litigants to prove it. In those in-
stances in which the legislation has made custom imperative, as
in some areas of labor law, the judge is obliged both to discover
and to apply it, according to the decision of the Chambre Sociale
of the Cour de Cassation rendered June 19, 1947.87 This solution
reveals perfectly the position of custom in French civil law.
Custom is regarded as a source of law, but it does not have
exactly the same value as legislation. It is a subsidiary rule of
law and even its recognition in legislation can do no more than
reinforce its validity and place it at the same level as the legis-
lation itself.
In summary, the respective importance of legislation and of
custom in a codified system of law reveals that legislation re-
mains the primary source of law, for if there has been a revival
of custom as an authoritative source of law it nevertheless re-
mains a subsidiary one.
PART II. THE PERSUASIVE SOURCES OF LAW
A system of law based only upon legislation and custom
would be very insufficient in two respects. First, it would be a
static system unadaptable to the evolution and changes in the
36. D.P.1903.1.149.
37. May 24, 1948, S.1948.1.175.
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political, economic, and social conditions of modern life. The
legislature cannot keep pace with these developments, unless it
enacts the necessary reforms daily, and even if it attempts to
do so, as it often has done in France in the last few years, the
frequent reforms tend to deprive the legislation of any cogency
and of the respect of the judge. As to custom, it is perfectly
understandable that its formation is too slow to follow the fast
evolution of society; often it would be dead before its birth if it
were the only authoritative source of law. Under these condi-
tions the courts have the task of giving life to the rules of law,
the task of adapting them to the needs of modern life. Their
role is particularly important in the countries where codifica-
tion occurred many years ago, as in France, and their importance
gives rise to an important and difficult problem, that of judicial
precedent in a codified system.
There is a second defect from which a system based only on
the authoritative sources of law would suffer. Legislation is an
expression of the will of the legislator and its validity rests upon
a delegation of power made by the people. For this reason, the
legislation should reflect the common sentiment of the people,
which in turn is necessarily based on the principles of justice,
morality, and equity, which are in the heart of every man. Ac-
cordingly, these notions are the very bases of every system of
law and must be guides for both the legislature and the judge.
It is this role of equity which must be considered after that of
judicial precedent.
There is a close connection between precedent and equity, for
often the case law is only a means of doing equity and rendering
some legislative solution consistent with morality.
Judicial Precedent
The authority of judicial precedent and its relation to legis-
lation in a codified system like the French will be considered in
succession.
The authority of judicial precedent in a codified system can
be summed up in two propositions. The first is that in theory
judicial precedent is not a source of law. The second proposition
is that in practice the situation is very different and in fact
precedent is a source of law.
On theoretical grounds, precedent cannot be considered a
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source of law because Article 5 of the Code Civil expressly pro-
hibits arr~ts de reglement, or judicial decisions intended to be
controlling in the future. This provision was prompted by the
desire to deny to the judge all power to create law, a desire
which followed naturally from the then prevailing notion that
legislation was the best possible expression of the law, the result
of the collective wisdom of the legislators, so that even the
natural law and the older principles, which themselves are likely
to be a guide for the legislators, should not be taken into con-
sideration by the judge. As a result of this Article 5 a judge is
never bound by an older decision rendered either by the same
court or by another court. For this reason, on theoretical
grounds, former judicial decisions may be ignored or overruled
very easily. Of course, even in a system in which judicial prec-
edent is a source of law, judges have a way of overruling past
decisions, but there remains an important difference between
systems in which precedent is theoretically binding and those,
like the French, in which it is theoretically unlawful. In the
first, the lawyer and judge are bound by the position of the
highest court, but in the second, as in the French, they are not.
Thus, in France the overruling of a decision of the Cour de
Cassation may be foreshadowed by a decision of a lower court
or court of appeal. For instance, until 1930 in France a child
born during the first 180 days following the marriage of his
parents was considered conceived before the marriage and there-
fore illegitimate.3 8 This solution was very unjust, because there
is no reason to make a difference between two children because
one of them had the good fortune of being born longer after the
marriage of his parents. But a court of appeal refused to apply
the decision of the Cour de Cassation. On review of the case the
Cour de Cassation agreed that the decision of the court of appeal
was more consistent with equity and changed its position.3 9
The real authority of the jurisprudence, however, is essen-
tially an authority of fact. For this reason, it is incorrect to
invoke arguments based on constitutional law, such as, for in-
stance, the principle of the separation of legislative and judicial
powers. It would be an encroachment of the judicial power on
the legislative if the judge avoided the application of legislation
on the ground that he was obliged to follow a judicial precedent.
This would be placing judicial precedent above legislation. But
38. Cass. civ. June 28, 1869, D.1869.1.335, S.1869.1.440.
39. Cass. civ. January 8, 1930, D.1930.1.51, S.1930.1.257, note Gdny.
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he does not do this. The judge follows precedent only as an
interpretation of the legislation, and it is not possible to re-
proach him for this attitude. In France, a strange experiment,
known as "the experiment of Judge Magnaud," has shown that
it is precisely when the judge makes a purely subjective applica-
tion of the law, rather than adhere to precedent, that there is
real danger of compromising the authority of legislation. 40
M. Magnaud, a judge of the trial court of Chfteau-Thierry
for twenty-five years at the end of the nineteenth century, ren-
dered his decisions without taking any account of the legisla-
tion and of the rules of law. He believed he had a peculiar sense
of equity and rendered his decisions according to his personal
convictions. The result was a great variation in his decisions,
thus revealing that if the judge does not take account of the rule
of law reflected in judicial precedent, there is absolutely no
security for the people.
Theoretically, the judge is entitled to ignore the decisions of
other courts and even his own. From this, G~ny and others have
concluded that the jurisprudence, or decisions, is not a source
of law. 41 This opinion need not be true. It must be kept in
mind that there is neither a duality nor a competition between
legislation and case law, between the written law and judicial
decisions. The jurisprudence is the legislation itself as it ap-
pears in the light of the judicial decisions. The real problem
would seem to be whether the judge may consider as null and
without value all the work of interpretation made before him,
or whether, for the purpose of a new decision, he accepts the
provision with all the explanations, additions, and transforma-
tions arising from the preceding decisions. This last solution
seems absolutely necessary. The independence of the judge in
the intellectual field must be combined with a constant psycho-
logical work which is the demand for a necessary continuity in
the law. Judges succeed each other, but they have the common
character of being the servants of a rule which of its nature
must be stable and they would be seriously inconvenienced by
perpetual controversy over judicial interpretation. This is the
first reason for the permanence and force of judicial precedent.4 2
40. 2 GtNY, M],THODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVA POSITIF;
ESSAI CRITIQUE, n* 145 (2d ed. 1954).
41. Esmein, La jurisprudence et la doctrine, 1 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
cIvIi, 5 (1902).




This inherent permanence of judicial precedent is, in addi-
tion, augmented by the collegiate organization of French courts.
Every court is composed of several judges, and in reality it is
the court and not the individual judges which renders a decision.
Even if the members of this court change, the court remains as
an entity. Every judge of a court has an intellectual and moral
solidarity not only with his colleagues, but also with the former
judges of the same court, and this feeling of solidarity con-
tributes to the stability of interpretation. Another factor which
augments the value of judicial precedent is the judicial hier-
archy. The French system is based on three courts, the trial
court, the court of appeal, and the Cour de Cassation. This
system secures the permanence of the jurisprudence through the
psychological coercion of the lower courts by the highest. When
a juridical difficulty presents itself in a lawsuit, every court is
free to reach its own decision, but when the Cour de Cassation
has rendered a decision on the question, the problem is trans-
formed. Theoretically the judge is not bound; but a court of
appeal does not like to see its decisions reversed by the Cour de
Cassation, and ninety percent of the judges adopt the position
of the Cour de Cassation rather than risk reversal. This influ-
ence is not limited to the judge. It extends to the practice, and
especially the notarial practice. 43
If the importance of the Cour de Cassation is so great, it is
because the judges are required to state the grounds for their
decisions; and it is paradoxical that it was precisely the legisla-
ture of the Revolution, the enemy of the courts, which imposed
this obligation which later became the means by which the ex-
tension of the rule of the courts was achieved. The judge must
state the motives for his decisions, the juridical reasoning by
virtue of which the decision is made. In other words, the motives
of law are the expression of the juridical opinion of the judge,
and this opinion is the source of the stability of judicial deci-
sions. In a codified law the judge bases the decision on a legis-
lative provision. But he is not content with alluding to the pro-
vision; he gives the meaning which he attaches to it. Therefore,
in every decision of the Cour de Cassation there is the affirma-
tion of a certain juridical doctrine about the question at issue.
This imposes on the lower courts not only the solution itself but
also its rationale, the juridical opinion from which the solution
43. BOUCHAUD, LA PRATIQUE NOTARIALE ET LE DROIT DES RIPGIMES MATRI-
MONIAUX, THESIS (1957) ; 3 ENCYCLOPADIE DALLOZ, DROIT CIVIL, Vo Juri8prudence.
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is drawn. For this reason it often happens that formulas of the
Cour de Cassation are repeated by the lower court until they
acquire the value of a legislative provision. The opinions of the
Cour de Cassation in important decisions are really substituted
in the practice for the provisions of the legislation. The famous
Jand'heur decision of the Cour de Cassation in 1930 affords an
example. 44 This decision presumes responsibility on the part of
one causing damage in automobile accidents and similar cases
unless he proves force mayeure, the act of a third person, or the
fault of the victim. Today this formula is found in every de-
cision of the lower courts and of the Cour de Cassation involving
this type situation.
In the light of this unusual case it may be said that in prac-
tice the authority of judicial precedent consists in the fact that
a series of decisions involving a question of law gives rise to
the conviction that the solution must be adopted. But it is not
sufficient to observe this fact. It is necessary to determine on
what conditions this authority of judicial precedent depends,
and it seems there are two: a certain publicity must be given to
the decision, and it must give rise to the conviction that it is
mandatory. The first condition does not raise any difficulty. It
is obvious that if a judgment is not published it is not known
and cannot have any influence upon other courts. On the con-
trary, it is more difficult to determine the objective data which
will give rise to the conviction that a precedent is binding.
The Intervention of the Cour de Cassation
The jurisprudence does not impose itself, and only the opin-
ions of the Cour de Cassation give rise to any feeling they must
be followed.45 As long as the Cour de Cassation has not rendered
a decision involving the question at hand, the tendency of each
of the courts of appeal is to follow its own opinions rendered in
previous decisions, or, if there be none, the decisions of other
courts of appeal are considered suggestive, but not binding. This
does not mean that the decisions of the courts of appeal and of
the trial courts are without interest. Indeed, the solutions given
by the courts of appeal often foreshadow the position of the
Cour de Cassation. Besides, the solutions of the courts of appeal
and of the trial courts must be taken into consideration even
44. Cass. r4unies February 13, 1930, D.P.1930.1.57, rapport Cons. Le Marcha-
dour, Gonc. Proc. Gdn. Matter, note Ripert.
45. Maury, Observations sur la Jurisprudence en tant que source de droit, in
Le droit privd frangais au milieu du XX sidcle, 1 ETUDES OFFERTES A G. RIPERT
28 (1950) ; 3 ENCYCLOPDIE DALLOZ, DROIT CIVI, v° Jurisprudence 20 (1952).
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after the decision of the Cour de Cassation. If they are in agree-
ment with the decision, their agreement is likely to augment its
authoritativeness, for then the agreement indicates acceptance
of the interpretation by the common opinion of jurists. On the
other hand, disagreement with the opinion of the Cour de Cassa-
tion may be the point of departure for an eventual overruling of
its jurisprudence.
The importance of the decisions of the courts of appeal and
of the trial courts, however, is subsidiary. In France most au-
thors think that the expression jurisprudence must be reserved
for decisions of the Cour de Cassation. Some modern authors go
further and affirm that jurisprudence is not made simply by
the fact that the Cour de Cassation has rendered a decision or
even several decisions on the point. The decisions of the cham-
bres r6unies have an authority which is sometimes at least equal
in fact to the authority of legislation, and since the reform of
the Cour de Cassation by the act of July 23, 1947,46 the deci-
sions of the assembl6e pl~ni~re civile have about the same au-
thority as the decisions of the chambres rdunies. But, the deci-
sions of the chambres rdunies and of the assemblde pl~ni~re ex-
cepted, isolated decisions of the Cour de Cassation cannot be
considered as judicial precedents. The judicial precedent exists
only if the solution is affirmed by a series of consistent decisions,
the analysis of which proves the continuity of juridical thought.
Even so, however, it must be stressed that judicial precedent
does not have any theoretical foundation in French law. Even
if there is a legal precedent, there is always the possibility of a
change in the position of the courts. The jurisprudence cannot
have the same cogency as legislation because the judge is obliged
to arrive at an understanding of the rules of law through the
decisions. For this reason the formation of the jurisprudence
resembles the formation of custom, and this resemblance ap-
pears very clearly in the second element of judicial precedent.
Assent Given to the Solution by the Common Opinion
of the Jurists
Some specialists in public law, in order to explain the au-
thority of judicial precedent, invoke the idea of a delegation of
power by the legislator to the judge. The legislator would im-
46. Hbraud, La loi du 23 juillet 1947 sur la Cour de Cassation, RECUEIL
DALLOZ 1947, Chronique, p. 125.
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plicitly give to the judge the power of completing his work,
and the coercive power of the judge would arise from the im-
plied approval of the legislator. There would be an implicit
reception of the rule by the legislator. But this explanation
rests upon a pure fiction and most modern French authors give
another. According to this explanation, the judge has the power
of "telling" the law (dire le droit), but this power is limited by
the eventual resistance of the jurists' common opinion so that
there is a reception of the rule not by the legislator, but by this
opinion of the jurists. If the opinion agrees with the solution
given by the court, it has a full authority; if there is disagree-
ment, experience shows that it often leads to an overruling of
the jurisprudence. Under these conditions, it is necessary to
consult both the decisions of the lower courts and the practice to
discover the reaction of the jurists.
It is obvious that the common opinion of the jurists has a
determining influence upon the decisions of the courts of appeal
and of the trial courts. When, after a first petition to review,
the solution of the first court of appeal having been reversed by
the Cour de Cassation, the case comes down before a second
court of appeal (cour de renvoi) which refuses to adopt the
solution of the Cour de Cassation, the resistance of the court of
appeal is based on the encouragements of public opinion. Some-
times the influence of public opinion entails an overruling of
the jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation. For instance, in the
case of Franck v. Connot47 the question was whether when an
accident is caused by a stolen automobile the person who is liable
is the thief or the owner of the car. The civil section decided
that the owner was liable, but most jurists considered that such
a solution was contrary to justice. This common opinion was
certainly the basis of the resistance of the second court of appeal
and of the overruling by the chambres r~unies of the solution
given by the civil section.
The role of the practice is less apparent because most of the
time it accepts without protest the decisions of the legislator
and of the judge, but there are nevertheless in French law some
instances in which the practice has manifested its disapproval. 48
In the light of this analysis of judicial precedent it is pos-
sible to define exactly the existing relation between legislation
47. Cass. r~unies, December 2, 1941, D.C.1942, 25, rapport Lagarde, note
Ripert, 8.1941.1.217, note Mazeaud.
48. 8 ENcYCLOPDIE DALLOZ, DROIT CIVIL, v* Jurisprudence 20 (1953).
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and jurisprudence. It is deeply erroneous to consider legislation
and jurisprudence as two independent sources of law and to
oppose them. Such an opposition is purely artificial because the
courts work on and in connection with the provisions of the
legislation. One of the most eminent French authors clearly de-
fined the problem when he wrote: "Beside the materially un-
alterable legislative provision, there is another provision which
is extended, restricted, or transformed by the courts according
to the cases. The skill of the interpreter of jurisprudence is to
discover through the decisions this new, living provision from
which the decisions arise. A jurisprudence which is really elabo-
rated can be recognized by the fact that it is possible to condense
it in terms of formulas which have the form, clarity, and gen-
erality of a legislative enactment." In that respect the role of
doctrine is particularly important and helpful for lawyers. The
authors condense the formulas of the decisions and construe
them. Often the formulas of the authors are used by the courts,
so that there is a close cooperation between doctrine and juris-
prudence.
Even in a codified system, the power of the courts is very
important. They fashion and adapt the rule for the purpose of
its concrete application. This power increases more when the
provision of law is insufficient and the judge must resort to the
fourth source of law, which is a guide both for the judge and for
the legislator, namely equity.
EQUITY
It is not easy to define equity, and the definition which is
usually given is subject to exceptions. In the abstract, equity is
a conception of justice based upon the equality of everyone and
respect for the rights of each. It gives rise to the sentiment of
equity, the spirit of equity which must be the basis of the
elaboration of law and justice. In concrete, equity means the
application of such justice, especially in cases not foreseen by
any legal provision, or which do not exactly correspond with
the juridical rules. Equity fills the unavoidable gaps in the
positive law and, in its absence, governs the case. In a strict
meaning which follows from the preceding, equity is opposed
both to the formal aspect of law and to a positivistic conception
of it; and it is this meaning which is used to characterize the




The notion of equity has certainly a moral nature. Aristotle
defined it as "what is just and unwritten and introduces into
the law moral considerations, a better justice, improving the
legal justice. '49 For Cicero equity was "the application of jus-
tice according to equality," and the Romans usually included
equity in a broad definition of law: "Jus est ars boni et aequi."
Domat considered equity as an aspect of natural law. In reality
the words "justice" and "equity" are nearly synonymous and
the idea of morality is not very different. They constitute the
natural law. Therefore it is necessary to sketch the evolution of
the natural law and its influence upon the positive law before
explaining the main applications of equity in French law.
The Natural Law Considered as a Basis of the Positive Law
Legal philosophers distinguish between positive law and nat-
ural law. Positive law is the law which is in force in a deter-
mined country at a certain period. It is the expression of the
legislature and has its source in the authority of the State. The
natural law is a series of rules having an abstract character. It
is not a binding rule in the same sense as the positive law be-
cause it does not have State-imposed sanction; but the legislator,
being obliged to make a reasonable, rational work, must be
guided by the natural law. Even though the legislator cannot
translate perfectly the principles of natural law into positive
law, these principles are an ideal which he must strive to reach.
Nevertheless the concept of natural law is not admitted by every
author; some deny its existence; others give it a content which
changes according to their philosophical conceptions. Under
these conditions it is not surprising to observe that natural law
has had many ups and downs in history.
The concept of natural law seems as old as the world. Greek
philosophy already knew of its existence.5 0 Its first traces may
be found in Greek literature. When Creon reproaches Antigone
for having given a burial to her brother, although this was for-
bidden by the positive law, she replied: "I did not know that your
orders might be paramount to the will of the immortals, to the
laws which are unwritten and cannot be blotted out. It is not
since today or since yesterday that these laws have existed. No-
49. SALOMON, LA NOTION DE JUSTICE CHE ARISTOTE (1938).
50. BuRLE, ESSAi HISTORIQUE SUR LE DPVELOPPEMENT DE LA NOTION DE DROIT
NATUREL DANS L'ANTIQUITt GRECQUE, THESIS (1908) ; GERNET, RECHERCHES SUR




body can tell when they arose." Thus Sophocles already knew
the concept of natural law and most of the ancient civilizations
have been sensitive to this notion. Professor Escarra has shown
that in the Chinese civilization when there was a conflict be-
tween positive and natural law, the second was considered as
paramount to the first.5 ' From antiquity to the seventeenth cen-
tury the idea of natural law never completely disappeared. After
having decreased during the barbarian invasions, its importance
increased with the development of Christianity. According to
the Christian philosophy there is a natural order intended by
God and which the reason can know. It is the meaning of the
formula "omnius potestas a deo."' 52 The natural law survived
until the decline of the middle ages and the sixteenth century
witnessed the first important criticism of it in the work of
Machiavelli in Italy and of Jean Bodin in France.53
It is strange that it is precisely at the time its existence was
seriously threatened by criticism that the natural law experi-
enced a new development with Grotius5 4 and Puffendorf,55 who
attempted to systematize and emphasize the classical conception
of natural law. In this classical conception natural law may be
defined as the body of rules of which man can have a knowledge
through the exercise of his reason. Man being a "reasonable
animal," it is normal for him to have an intuitive knowledge of
justice and to be able to deduce rules of law. This entails an im-
portant consequence. Human reason being the same in all places
and in all times, the natural law consists of some general and
unalterable rules available in every country. Nevertheless, even
in the classical conception, some divergences appear when we
approach the problem of the source of natural law. Some authors
think that natural law has a religious source, that the godlike
will is the basis of natural law. It was the argument used by the
King's legists in order to secure the authority of the Monarchy
when it was threatened by feudalism. The King being the repre-
sentative of God is the guardian of the godlike will. Bossuet 6
affirmed that the King had received his power from God and
51. ESCARRA, LE DROIT CHINOIS (1936).
52. LACHANCE, LE CONCEPT DE DROIT SELON ARISTOTE ET SAINT THoMAS,
THESIS (2d ed. 1948) ; STANG, LA NOTION DE LOI DANS SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN,
THESIS (1926) ; LOTTIN, LE DROIT NATUREL CHEZ SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN (2d ed.
1931).
53. CHEVALLIER, LES GRANDES OEUVRES POLITIQUES DE MACHIAVEL A Nos
JOURS 38 (1950).
54. DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625).
55. DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1672).
56. POLITIQUE TIR1fE DE L'ECRITURE SAINTE (1679 and 1709).
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must exercise it in the interest of the people. Others, and chiefly
Domat, thought that every law has a divine origin, but dis-
tinguished the laws revealed by God (divine positive laws) and
the natural law revealed by reason without divine influence.
During the eighteenth century, the natural law remained
very important. Doubtless it was at this time that its influence
on the positive law was most pronounced. Some kings in Europe,
and chiefly Frederic II, tried enacting a positive law directly
arising from the principles of natural law. However, under the
influence of the individualistic philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau, the notion of natural law was considerably modified.57 The
tendency was toward a generalization of natural law in terms of
the dictates of reason, but at the same time the tendency toward
individualism led to the conception of a natural law devoid of
social character. The end of the law was not the common inter-
est, but the individual interest. The principles of natural law, it
was thought, must emphasize the rights of personality in order
to protect it. The root of this conception is in the philosophy of
Rousseau. 58 Society is a fact subsequent to the individual. A
contract, the social contract, has been made between man and
society. By virtue of this contract, the individual has alienated
one part, but only one part, of his rights. The purpose of nat-
ural law is to watch over the rights which have not been alien-
ated and to extend them as much as possible. This conception of
natural law was embodied in the French positive law of the end
of the eighteenth century. This should not be surprising if we
remember the influence of the philosophers on the revolutionary
work and the similarities existing between individualistic phi-
losophy and the ideas of the legislator of 178g. This is partic-
ularly clear in the Dgelaration des Droits de l'Homme of 1789.
The importance of the natural law in Europe decreased dur-
ing the nineteenth century mainly because of the influence of the
German historical school. In the German doctrine of historical
materialism, the most eminent representative of which was
Savigny,5 9 the law is not of divine or rational origin. It is con-
57. Lion, Le contrat social avant Rousseau, in ARCHIVES DE PHiHosOPHIE Du
DROIT ET DE SOCIOLOGIr JURIDIQUE, no. 4, p. 157, at 160 (1935) ; Richard, La
critique de l'hypoth~se du contrat social avant Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ARCHIVES
DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DRoiT 45 (1937).
58. CHErvALIR, LES GRANDES OEUVRES POLITIQUES DE MACHIAVEL A NOS
JouRs 147 (1950) ; Lion, Le problme du contrat social chez Rousseau, ARCHIVES
DE PHuosoPHIE Du DROIT, No. 4, p. 157 (1935) ; Hubert, Rousseau et rEcole
positiviste, ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE Du DROIT 407 (1932).
59. SAVIGNY, DE LA VOCATION DE NOTRE TEMPS POUR LtGIFkRER ET POUR
UTILISER LA SCIENCE DU DROIT (1814).
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stituted by the habits of men living in society. Law is a science
based upon observation, a product of history which cannot be
unalterable because it necessarily follows the evolution of society.
The feeling of the representatives of the German historical
school is that custom is better than legislation because it can be
adapted more easily to changing social conditions. The success
of the German school during the nineteenth century led to an
eclipse of natural law which persisted with the appearance of the
sociological doctrine of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl. 60 For them,
the rule of law rests upon the observation of the existence of a
collective conscience which is different from the individual con-
science. Therefore a particular social structure necessarily gives
rise to a particular type of law. Such an opinion is the juridical
counterpart of sociological determinism. It denies the existence
of an universal and unalterable natural law, the law changing
with the evolution of society.
This conception suffers from two defects: first, it is purely
descriptive, based upon observation and does not take into con-
sideration the fact that law is chiefly a deductive science. With
this theory, it is impossible to pass from what exists to what
must exist, and the activity of the legislator cannot be justified.
Second, sociological determinism has been criticized by Bergson,
who has emphasized the existence of a free will in man which is
important in the elaboration of law, and explains why the rules
of law may be different in countries with about the same civili-
zations.
The criticism and the decline of positivist philosophy explain
the revival of natural law in Europe during the twentieth cen-
tury. However, the lessons of history have been useful, and to-
day we have a less ambitious, but more exact, conception of nat-
ural law which is revealed by the analyses of the main theories.
Theory of natural law with a variable content. For the most
eminent representative of this theory, Raymond Saleilles,6 ' nat-
ural law is the whole of the ideal principles that every man has in
himself. The natural law is variable according to the psychology
and the conscience of every man, e.g., in antiquity, slavery was
consistent with the natural law; today it is not. The theory of
60. BOUGL , BILAN DE LA SOCIOLOGIE FRANQAIS CONTEMPORAINE (1935);
MAUNIER, INTRODUCTION A LA SOCIOLOGIE (1938).
61. Gaudemet, L'oeuvre de Saleilles et l'oeuvre de Gdny en m6thodologie juri-
dique et en philosophie du droit, in 2 RECUEIL D'ETUDES SUR LES SOURCES DU
DROIT EN L'HONNEUR DE FRANgOIS G.NY 5 (1934).
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Saleilles was popular in the beginning of the twentieth century,
but it was criticized very quickly. Saleilles was reproached for
confusing the principles of natural law and the applications of
natural law. The change in the condition of the slave may ex-
plain the prohibition of slavery by modern law. The existence of
slavery in antiquity does not prove that at this time the principle
of human liberty was unknown. Principles are unalterable; only
the applications change. On the other hand, Saleilles' opinion
leads to the ruin of natural law. If the natural law is both psy-
chological and individual, it is of no interest for the legislator,
whose work is necessarily general.
Theory of the Natural Law as the Objective Law
Duguit considers social solidarity the basis of law. Individ-
uals having to live in society, life is possible only if there is social
solidarity.6 2 From this solidarity arise general principles which
must have an influence upon the positive law, and these are prin-
ciples of natural law. Duguit's theory suffers from the same de-
fect as the preceding. Social solidarity is a fact which does not
provide a basis for a rule of law. Neither does it provide the
means of building a system of natural law, nor does it explain
the existence of particular obligations, social solidarity giving
rise only to the concept of duty.
Theory of natural law limited to few general principles. Ac-
cording to G~ny6 it is a mistake to be too ambitious, for it is im-
possible to build a complete system of natural law. However, the
ideal of justice must be pursued because the negation of such an
ideal would prevent all initiative and social progress, the search
for justice and equity being the most important factor of human
activity. But the content of the natural law must be reduced to
a few general principles resting upon morality, justice, and
equity (e.g., the rights of property, liberty, and indemnification
for wrongs). These principles are so general that they exist in
every legislation. The differences appear only in the applications
which must be adapted to the social character of each civiliza-
tion. G6ny's opinion is adhered to by most of the jurists in
France. It explains how the natural law remains a guide for the
62. DUGUIT, L'ETAT, LE DROIT OBJECTIP ET LA LOI POSITIVE (1901) ; UPC,
LE FONDEMENT DU DROIT DANS LA DOCTRINE DE LMoN DUGUIT; RtGLADE, TnftoRI
GtN RALE DU DROIT DANS L'OEUVRE DE DUGUIT; WALINE, LES IDgES MAITRESSES
DES DEUX GRANDS PUBLICISTES FRANQAIS; DUGUIT ET HAURIOU, ANNE POLITIQUE
ET PARLEMENTAIRE (1929).
63. 2 G.NY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE, EN DROIT PRIVt PosinF 192 (1922).
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legislator and at the same time allows for the practical role of
positive law.
The Role of Equity in French Law
Equity is a guide both for the legislator and for the judge.
When elaborating an act the legislator must keep in mind the
fundamental principles of justice and equity. Every act which
would not take these principles into account would be repealed
quickly. Montesquieu was right when he affirmed: "Useless
legislation weakens the necessary." However, the legislative task
is very difficult because both the needs of justice and equity and
the security of persons must be satisfied. Sometimes these two
aims are contradictory, as in acquisitive prescription, but in
most instances justice and equity must be taken into account
first and security second. Equity is rarely sacrificed to security.
Equity is a guide for the judge too and many institutions of
French civil law are based upon justice and equity. Occasionally
the legislation itself gives the judge discretionary power. For
instance, Article 1135 of the Code Civil states that the judge
must construe contracts according to equity; alimony must be
fixed by reference to the resources of the debtor and the needs of
the creditor; and in determining the custody of children after
divorce the judge must seek the interest of the children. At other
times, the judge extends an institution by resort to equity. For
instance, Articles 201 and 202 of the Code Civil state that the
nullity of a marriage is not retroactive when the spouses were
in good faith. French courts have extended this institution of
the putative marriage in such a way that a finding of putative
marriage is now the rule and retroactive nullity the exception ;04
the Code Civil foresaw only a few limited causes for suspension
of acquisitive prescription, but the French courts have extended
them by reviving the maxim contra non valentem agere non cur-
rit praescriptio because they considered it unjust to allow pre-
scription to run against a person who cannot bring an action.6 5
There are, too, several institutions of French civil law which
are based exclusively on equity. For example, the theory of the
64. Cass. civ. November 5, 1913, D.P. 1914.1.281, note Binet; Cass. civ. Janu-
ary 8, 1930, D.P. 1930.1.51; Paris, March 30, 1938, D.H.1938.344; Trib. civ.
Montpellier, July 16, 1946, Gaz. Pal. 1946.2.183.
. 65. Cass. civ. December 11, 1918, D.P.1923.1.96, S.1921.1.161, note Morel;




abuse of right certainly rests upon equity, for the exercise of a
right may under certain circumstances cause a prejudice to an-
other person and be contrary to equity.66 This theory, which had
its origin in connection with property rights, has had an extra-
ordinary development in French law and now extends to many
fields, e.g., labor law, strikes, the right to bring an action in
justice. The abuse of right does not exist only when there is an
intentional fault. Mere negligence may entail abuse of right and
give rise to damages. The basis of this theory is the notion of
equity. Everyone has some prerogatives, but if their exercise is
likely to cause an injury, he must be very careful to limit the in-
jury as much as possible. In that respect the ideal of equity con-
forms to the needs of social life. The theory of unjust enrich-
ment rests upon the same basis. 6 7 There is absolutely no pro-
vision in the Code Civil specifying a general rule on unjust en-
richment. There is, however, a general principle of equity ac-
cording to which a person must not be unjustly enriched at the
expense of another. French courts tried to fill the gap by using
negotiorum gestio, but this institution, which presupposes the
intention of administering the affair of another person, was too
narrow and in 1892 the Cour de Cassation, starting from the
idea of equity, created the rule of unjust enrichment and its
sanction, the action de in rem verso.5 The character of this
action demonstrates perfectly the role of equity in French law.
The action de in rem verso exists only if there is no other action
available. It has a subsidiary character, which proves that equity
is a subsidiary, indirect source of law. The judge uses it as a last
resort when there is no other remedy. It is even considered de-
sirable that the judge not use it without legislative direction.
In summary, we can say that the study of the respective im-
portance of the different sources of law in a codified system
reveals that legislation retains its supremacy, but that the pro-
66. JOSSEBAND, DE L'ABUS DES DROITS (1905) ; Saleilles, De l'abus du droit,
BULLETIN DE LA SOCIITt D'ETUDES L1tGISLATIVES 325 (1905); Capitant, Sur
l'abus des droits, 28 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DROIT CIVIL 365 (1928) ; Rounst, Les
droits discr~tionnaires et les droits contr6lds, 42 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DROIT
CIVIL 1 (1944).
67. RIPERT, LA RGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES n, 133 (4th ed.
1949) ; Chevallier, Observations sur la rdpdtition des enrichissements non caud8s,
in Le droit priv6 frangais au milieu du XX sikcle, 2 ETUDES OFFERTES A G. RIPERT
237; Rouast, L'enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile, 2 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DROIT CIVIL 35 (1922) ; BtGUET, L'ENRICHISSEMENT SANS CAUSE,
THESIS (1945) ; GORA, L'ENRICHISSEMENT AUX D1tPENS D'AUTRUI, SOURCE AUTON-
OME ET GtNtRALE D'OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT PRIVP, FRANQAIS, THESIS (1949).
68. Cass. civ. June 15, 1892, D.P.1892.1.596.
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liferation of legislation lessens the respect given it by the judi-
ciary. One of the main purposes of the civil code reform is to
revive the cogency of the legislation without which a codified
system of law cannot work satisfactorily.
